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It is a serious question how we ought to regard these differences of opinion we have on such matters. Are these issues on which there is a single right view, or only the possibility of different opinions, mutually opposing gut-reactions? Is there any real law between nations, or only a vague kind of shared or customary morality? Does 'illegality' matter anyway, if nothing can be done against a superpower in alleged violation of alleged law? Are morality and justice, as Thrasymachus long ago argued against Socrates, nothing more than the interest of the powerful?
1 What other objective test do we have for morality or immorality in such matters? As for prudence, whose interests count, and how long is the long run when we concern ourselves with long-run self-interest? How can we judge counterfactually what would have happened had the intervention not taken place when and ho it did?
Questions like these matter deeply. Such questions have mattered to human beings since the beginnings of recorded history. The theme of my lecture, "On Public
Law and the Law of Nature and Nations", is about one particular academic commitment to finding a basis for reasonable answers to them. It is also, of course, the title of the oldest law chair in our University, the tercentenary of which is the occasion for our celebrating three hundred years of scholarship, research and teaching in law here.
II Some Hasty History (a) The Regius Chair -How it Came About
As a job-title, or job-description, "Public Law and the Law of Nature and 'Bobbing John' Mar was, however, a somewhat insecure supporter of the Union and being 'the dictate of reason determining every rational being to that which is congruous and convenient for the nature and condition thereof'. 6 We know this law, he said, either by divine revelation through scripture, or because its basic precepts are written in our hearts, as was stated by St Paul in chapter 2 of his Letter to the Romans. 7 Finer points of law can be worked out by reasoning from first principles in difficult cases. First principles of equity are "Obedience Freedom and Engagement" and of positive law, "Society Property and Commerce". 8 Not merely can such principles be traced out through the established and enforceable positive law of Scotland as of any other country. They also form the basis of law between those who have no common sovereign power to lay down law among them. Notably, this applies to relationships between independent sovereigns that is, independent states. The Law of Nature, if it exists, is thus a foundation not merely for the law of each nation, but also for the law between nations, Ius Gentium or ' the law of nations' in the contemporary understanding of the phrase.
The particular constitutional foundations of each state constitute its public law.
This was a topic of considerable interest to Scots of 1706-7 as they deliberated whether or not to dissolve their ancient constitution and set up a new united kingdom with the constitutional structure laid down in the Articles of Union and associated legislation. Article XVIII indeed said that public law could be made uniform in Great Britain, while the private law of Scotland should be free from amendment by the new Parliament of Great Britain except 'for the evident utility of the subjects' in Scotland.
II(c) Enlightenment and Law of Nature
Well, there is a brief and breathless account of a line of thought that could have Hume, no friend to rationalist natural law, argued vigorously against the idea that we might be born with moral or other information 'written in our hearts'. He 6 rejected the whole idea of innate knowledge, arguing that all our ideas come to us through sensory experience acting on the mind, which is initially a blank sheet. We have a shared, or 'common' sense of the right and the wrong. 10 Insights into moral truths that we apprehend by recourse to this common sense are entirely natural, and so 'natural law' is a fully acceptable concept.
II (d) Meanwhile in England
Contemporary and later philosophical radicals in England learned more from Hume than from Reid or Smith. Finding their own exemplar of the natural law tradition in the Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone -like Areskine, successively professor and then judge -they, and most particularly Jeremy Bentham, condemned 'natural law' thought as simply an ideological prop for political and legal conservatism. Law should be subjected to a critique, based on a Hume-like but more rigorously elaborated principle of utility, the 'greatest happiness principle'. Law is not some 'natural' set of principles; it is simply the command of the sovereign. As such it can either be beneficial or be damaging in its effects on human happiness. The sovereign should be persuaded to reform existing law to improve its beneficial quality and diminish its harmful quality. Lorimer's advocacy, as I mentioned, was based on his own German experiences and expressed his admiration for the way the great Universities of Germany had built around eminent professors a substantial body of Rechtswissenschaft ('science of law' is our lame and unconvincing translation). This was on intellectually equal terms with the other human and social sciences and the natural sciences.
It is a bold but a justified claim that we, the Law School of the University of Edinburgh now in the twenty-first century, are, and have achieved recognition as, a major international centre of legal learning. We educate, rather than train, aspiring members of our own Scottish legal professions, and we also educate at undergraduate and even more at postgraduate level students from all around the world. Our faculty members are in wide demand and make extensive contributions around Europe and the wider world to learning both in legal doctrinal scholarship, in law and technology, and in the philosophical historical and social scientific study of law.
In the process, the first, and then the later few, historic Chairs with which we can make one inference: each person here has a properly working gene known as 'FOXP2' on chromosome 7. 'Th[is] gene is necessary for the development of normal grammatical and speaking ability in human beings, including fine motor control of the larynx. … When it is bust, the person never develops full language.' 24 Of course, genes that are necessary for speech are not sufficient for it. They are themselves switched on through the exposure of the human being between infancy and puberty to the environment of a speech community, and the language one develops is the language of that community -a language translatable, however, if with imperfections, into any other language.
III (b) Speech, Nature and Norms
As Thomas Reid long ago and Ludwig Wittgenstein much more recently pointed out, a private language is inconceivable. The power of speech is one of the irreducibly social powers of the human mind. The conditions of learning and using speech thus depend absolutely on a common adherence to the common norms of grammar and the like that structure our speech. These must include a norm favouring truthfulness and sincerity over falsehood and cheating, for a community without such norms would either never develop a language or swiftly lose the one they have. That lying and cheating are wrong is not itself written in the genome. But abilities that can be developed by bearers of the human genome do depend on most members of a speech community treating them as wrong most of the time, and refraining from them especially in front of learners.
Let us add to this a recognition of the connection between language as speech by vocalising or signing and the invention and development of writing. First written, then printed, and now digitally encrypted language messages create an extraordinary human facility that has progressively distinguished us from our closest relatives, the chimpanzees, whose gene code is astonishingly close to our own. This is our capacity to communicate at a distance both in place and in time, and to accumulate knowledge generation by generation, becoming ever more specialised in the branches of knowledge we can master and thus almost inevitably undergoing an ever more advanced social division of labour. This implies a capability to develop a more and more extensive civil society, in turn requiring an extension of at least provisional trust across an ever-wider range of people who are not personally acquainted with each
other. This idea is again familiar to any reader of Adam Smith.
The civility of civil society, and the impersonal trust it both requires and underpins, is a remarkable achievement to the extent that humans manage to achieve and sustain it. Hitherto, at least, it has depended on the construction and maintenance is also a part of our nature, but one against which our institutions can help us to guard.
The example of human language from which these brief reflections commenced is an important one. We all speak some language, perhaps more than one.
Languages are highly normative. Yet their norms were not made by any human act of will clad with some form of institutional authority -even the académie française has a comparatively subsidiary role in respect of the great language it cares for. The moral is that we humans are norm-users before we are norm-creators, or legislators. Our sense of duty and obligation to each other is and has to be prior to any authoritative imposition of rules upon us. Were it not so, civil institutions could never have developed. territories, the law they make and uphold has a coercive character different from that of other forms of normative order that are important to us.
III (d) Institutions of Law
The definition of law that flows from these reflections is this: law is institutional normative order, and state law is a coercively upheld institutional normative order. It is both different from morality, and yet it is subject to moral constraints. As moral beings, moral beings with an intrinsic disposition to sociality, we live according to standards of rightness and wrongness. As moral beings we are autonomous in respect of these standards. We are, and can be none other than, a "law unto ourselves" in this respect. The very institutional character of states and their laws entails that they are never entitled to more than provisional moral assent from autonomous moral beings, but they do often earn that assent, and the price of their overthrow is an extreme one.
Conversely, institutional regulation is the prime mark of what counts as law within a state. The adopted constitution and the legislation and (to the extent it is recognised) the body of judicial precedent recorded in law reports are, for good or ill, the valid law of the state in question.
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The controversial character of any moral opinion among human beings, and the corresponding controversies about justice and the common good within a state or union do create a necessity for institutional law, and coercion seems necessary to a sense of security about rights enshrined in law. The moral reason for having institutional law does not, however, mandate any programme whatsoever under the name of law. There are limits to what can conceivably be put forward as publicly justifiable in a political discourse. Gross extremes of injustice in human conduct deprive of legal character the acts of those who perform them or who mandate them.
However a holocaust might be set in motion, and no matter the institutional authority of those who set it in motion, it cannot, need not, and indeed must not, be recognised by anyone as having any kind of authority under law.
The case for these dogmatically stated opinions is, I hope, more carefully and convincingly argued in the pages of Institutions of Law than I can possibly argue them here. Thirty five years ago, I came to Edinburgh to a chair of jurisprudence in respect of whose official title I had continuing responsibility mainly for the middle term, the 'law of nature'. At the time, I was a straightforward legal positivist, and my stance toward the law of nature was patiently to refute it and show how human law was intelligible without recourse to any such construct. I have steadily come to realise, however, that whatever valuable insights into law the legal positivists established, these are not antithetical to some broader conception of a law of nature, a law grounded in the nature of humans as the remarkable biological organisms we are. In particular, we must recognize that the user's perspective on norms has primacy over the issuer's. People are law-users more fundamentally than they are law-makers. To this extent, I seem in the end to have developed into a part-way worthy custodian of the law of nature, and a reasonably fit exponent of "public law and the law of nature and nations". It has been a profound pleasure, and a great privilege, to have tried.
I started this lecture by raising deep and currently controversial questions about war and peace. Nothing that I have said demonstrates the rightness or wrongness of specific answers to these questions. What I do think it important to have established is that there is a genuine possibility of non-arbitrary and rationally grounded answers to them. However difficult the arguments may be, the domains with which we are concerned are domains of the true and the false, not just places for rival gut-reactions, or triumphalist demonstrations of hard power.
